Withdrawing from Iraq

RAND @ USIP: Withdrawing from Iraq
Marc Lynch, Foreign Policy Blog

This afternoon I ducked in to part of an interesting USIP event which presented a new RAND report on the issues facing the withdrawal from Iraq (See below for link to summary). I got there a bit late, which is okay because I had already read the report. And I had to leave early, because summer camp pickup waits for no man. But it was still good to see Jim Dobbins, several members of the first-rate RAND team, Brian Katulis (of the Center for American Progress) and Michael Gordon (who I just learned has decided to join Kim Kagan's Institute for the Study of War).

While this may not have been the intention of any of the presenters, what I read in the report and saw in the panel reinforced my sense that the Obama strategy is on the right track despite the recurrent bouts of hand-wringing. RAND's painstaking and careful analysis demonstrates, unsurprisingly, that there are risks and challenges associated with either a faster or a slower track, just as there are with the current track. What's more, there are often unrecognized costs to staying under current political conditions -- such as those outlined by the now famous Reese memo (the story of which is for another day), which outlined a number of points which a RAND presenter said mirrored concerns they had heard from a number of people working in Iraq. Given the logistical and political costs of changing the strategy now, marginal differences in those risks and payoffs couldn't justify a shift --- there would have to be really significant differences, and there really aren't.

A few other observations from the event.

It was good to see a packed room. Interest in Iraq has clearly faded in the US and in Washington, where the economy, health care, and the AfPak situation suck up most of the air. Several recent Iraq events I've attended have been less well attended compared to similar events in the past. It's good to see that a think tank report in the dead of August can still draw a crowd.

At the same time, it's really remarkable how much octane has been drawn out of the debate. The tough decisions were made last year, both over the course of the primaries and general election (where Obama articulated the strategy he is now executing almost exactly) and through the SOFA negotiations (where the Iraqi government forced the Bush administration to accept terms roughly equivalent to what Obama was proposing). The arguments now are about mitigating risk and managing the technicalities, as the initiative steadily shifts from American hands to Iraqi hands. Sure, there are a multitude of serious challenges which remain -- most of them well known to all who follow the debate, and upon which the policy community must remain focused. But the difference in tone and intensity in the debate is palpable.

Katulis and Gordon both raised an important point about the role of civilians in the future US engagement with Iraq. The Obama doctrine, suggested Katulis, is about the integration of non-military dimensions of power -- just as articulated by John Brennan in his major policy address at CSIS this afternoon. But that has not been matched in practice, complained Gordon, by the State Department, the Embassy, or civilian agencies in Iraq. What lessons does this have for other arenas, like Afghanistan, where US strategy seems to depend on a major role for inter-agency cooperation and civilian contributions? What is the appropriate role of American civilians in post-occupation Iraq? That's a debate that needs to happen.

There's more, but that's all for now.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG882.sum.pdf