Iraq: A Time to Stay?

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By Anthony Cordesman

There may well be a case for accelerating some aspects of the US
military withdrawal from Iraq. The present plan has an insurance plan
built into the withdrawal schedule. It delays the start of further major
reductions until after the Iraqi national election in early 2010, and
then rushes them out before August. So far, things have gone better in
Iraq than some anticipated. If this continues, it may well make sense to
start reductions earlier. This would send a clear signal to all Iraqis
that the US really is leaving, it would put less strain on the US forces
in Iraq by carrying out a slower and steadier pace of withdrawals, and
it would ease the overall strain on US forces of fighting two prolonged
major regional contingencies.

However, an exit is not an exit strategy. US policy has to look at other
considerations than simply when and how quickly it should remove its
troops. It has do what it can to ensure that it leaves a stable and
secure Iraq behind once its troops are gone; that US trainers and
enablers continue to offer Iraq support; and that that it helps Iraq
acquire the capabilities it needs to defend itself against any pressure
from its neighbors.

US troops are scarcely the answer to all of Iraq's remaining problems
with internal security and political reconciliation. They do, however,
plan a key role in damping down the tensions and potential clashes
between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds. They still play a key role in helping
Iraqi forces deal with Al Qa'ida in Iraq and other Sunni insurgent
movements - which are still all too active in areas like Ninewa and
Diyala. They help the Iraqi forces deal with the potential threat from
Shi'ite militias, the Special Groups, and the extremist elements
supported in part by Iran. This may not make them loved by the Iraqi
people - and the vast majority of Iraqi Arabs want all US forces out as
soon as possible - but it does make them a useful bridge that helps buy
time until the Iraqi security forces are more equipped to do the job.

More broadly, President Obama will fail as a commander in chief, and his
Administration will fail with him, if he does not manage US military
withdrawals in a way that creates a sustained effort to help Iraq move
towards lasting stability at the political, economic, and military
levels. The challenge is not just getting US forces out. It is make the
transition to a civilian lead that is backed by an adequate mix of civil
aid in governance and development, and a training mission that will help
Iraq become truly independent - not only of US forces but in dealing
with the ambitions of all its neighbors.

The Changing Challenge to Iraqi Security

Any visitor to today's Iraq can see that violence has been sharply
reduced, that US and Iraqi forces have done much to meet the mix of
remaining threats, and that Iraqi forces are making real progress. At
the same time, any planning for US troop withdrawals must consider the
reality that the US and ISF have not yet "won" in Iraq, and they
continue to face serious risks.

Ninewa and Mosul remain challenges. Major terrorist attacks continue and
Iraqis and Americans and Iraqis. Various violent elements of AQI/ISI,
FREs, Special Groups and other threats will continue to pose a challenge
at some level even after we have withdrawn US forces in 2011. It seems
equally clear that Iraq will face challenges and pressure from its
neighbors, particularly Iran.

Moreover, the sharp reductions in Sunni Jihadist threats and in Shi'ite
threat like the Sadr Army have exposed deep internal tensions in Iraq
that create the threat of a different kind of violence.

The main challenges to Iraqi security are becoming Iraq's political
divisions and ethnic and sectarian tensions. As every briefing from our
country team made clear, the US faces major challenges in the
Arab-Kurdish struggle, and from Iraq's remaining sectarian tensions.

The Kurdish Challenge

Finding a stable solution to Arab-Kurdish relations, and solving the
problems created by the disputed areas in the north is critical to
Iraq's future. It is clear that tensions between Arab and Kurd are
rising, and that patience is thin on both sides. The UN-US effort to
find a solution to the Arab-Kurd issue has become a critical priority,
and one where changes in the UN team seem to have occurred at precisely
the wrong moment. The 502-page UN report on Arab-Kurdish disputes that
was issued this spring did little more than map the exact scale of
differences and polarize Arab, Kurd, and Turcoman. The US military has
had to intervene at least three times to ensure that fighting did not
break out between each side in the dispute areas, and both Kurdish and
Arab leaders seem to be becoming more rigid over time.

Arab-Kurdish tensions in Ninewa and Kirkuk, and throughout out the
disputed areas, are part of an explosive situation that will require an
extraordinary diplomatic effort by the US, UN, and other outside powers.
The risk of an open break between the two sides, serious clashes, or a
major outbreak of fighting are all too real. They are going to require
at least several years of careful attention by steadily declining US
forces to do everything possible to head off clashes that could escalate
far beyond the intent of either side.

The Kurds will need a sustained US diplomatic and military effort to
persuade them to be realistic, to look beyond history and geography, and
to look beyond the gains they made during the period immediately after
2003 because the Arab side was then so weak. They need to accept
practical compromises and do so a quickly as possible, before a new
legacy of tension and anger makes such compromise steadily more
difficult.

Iraqi Arabs will need a similar ongoing effort to persuade them to pay
more attention to achieving national unity, rather than exploiting the
Kurdish issue to score domestic political points in their own internal
power struggles or focusing on Arab identity to the exclusion of
national unity. They need to remember that the Kurds have legitimate
reason to seek some degree of autonomy, to focus on the protections
offered by the constitution, and to want Iraqi Security Forces to be
structured in a way that gives the Kurds some guarantee of security and
ensures that Kurdish officers have a fair share of command.

The Sectarian Challenge

At the same time, Sunni-Shi'ite tensions pose serious challenges on
their own. Most Iraqi Arabs seem fed up with violence and extremism.
They want peace, good government, development, and progress. Iraqi Arab
politics, however, threaten to divide Iraqis along lines of sectarian
and regional interest. The struggle to win the coming national election
already has primacy, and it is clear that the tensions between Prime
Minister Maliki and the CoR are growing.

Iraq's Sunni Arabs increasingly distrust what they see as Maliki's
effort to expand his power and political support at the expense of
Sunnis, and what they see as a form of de-Baathifcation that sharply
favors Shi'ites while continuing to limit or push out Sunnis from both
the government and ISF. Shi'ites made it clear that they fear the
resurgence of both elements in both politics and the ISF.

These problems are compounded by the internal fragmentation of Sunni and
Shi'ite politics at every level. There still are no Sunni political
parties that have demonstrated that they can speak for Sunnis at the
national level, and the past Shi'ite coalition is fragmenting along pro
and anti-Maliki lines. This could lead to local violence, and trigger
tensions within the Shi'ites and Sunnis that could suddenly flare up
into major violence.

The US Response

The question then arises as to what, if anything, the US can do to halt
such internal domestic conflicts before they begin, beyond continuing
the political and military effort that the country team already has
underway . Iraq is now sovereign, and many forms of military
intervention can do as much or more harm than good.

One answer - although it may be unpopular in Washington - lies in
carefully targeted aid. The US should not phase out aid too quickly in
the areas where there are ethnic and sectarian fault lines. Limited
amounts of aid can be used to enhance dialog, to try to bridge
differences, and to lever the kind of positive action that can bring
various sides together. The Embassy needs the resources and flexibility
to use such tools quickly, and then to enhance negotiations as well as
provide more conventional types of aid. The Administration and the
Congress need to understand that the past mistakes in the aid effort,
and current financial pressures, are not a rationale for cutting aid so
quickly and so severely that it jeopardizes all that has been
accomplished since the beginning of the surge.

As for the US military, it needs to make use of every possible
intelligence asset to be able to avoid clashes between elements of the
ISF and other factions. The key, however, lies in military assistance.
There is tremendous pressure to downsize such US efforts as part of US
withdrawals, but there are still good reasons to keep the military
advisory and aid efforts at higher levels than are currently planned,
and to give these efforts more focus on healing Iraq's internal
divisions as distinguished from dealing with its security problems. Some
of this effort is already underway, but added CERP and other military
aid could be used to reduce these tensions and help keep ISF development
on track in critical areas - and help bridge over the impact of Iraq's
current budget crisis and provide US advisers with leverage in
incentivizing the ISF to use its own resources effectively.

Arab-Kurdish tensions must be a central focus of both diplomatic and
military attention. The US is already making efforts to try to keep the
ISF from becoming polarized along Arab-Kurd lines, but these efforts may
need added assets, and the US may need to rethink past plans in
supporting the expansion of the Iraqi Army.

The plan to create largely Kurdish 15th and 16th Divisions may now be
financially and politically impossible, but some form of this option
still seems highly desirable. Having largely Kurdish forces within the
Iraqi Army still seems a good way to integrate a Pesh Merga that now
totals nearly 190,000 men into a smaller force that is both national and
offers the Kurds some degree of security. The US might also consider
making it clear that the level of US military aid and assistance will
vary with the degree to which Kurdish officers are not pushed out of
senior command positions and Kurds are integrated into all of the
elements of the ISF.

More broadly, US military advice and aid provide a powerful tool in
trying to prevent the ethnic and sectarian polarization of the ISF, and
in making it national and professional. It may be tempting to downsize
this effort too quickly, to eliminate or reduce aid too much, or to
focus on securing withdrawal. The US must resist this temptation. It
should seek to maintain as strong a military aid effort as possible
through 2011, and to institutionalize such an effort in 2012 and beyond.
It is clear in talking to members of the ISF that most senior Iraqi
officers want such aid and recognize that it is needed. It is also clear
that Iraqi officers do see the need for a national, rather than
polarized, ISF and that working with them can be a powerful force in
developing Iraqi unity.

Planning for the Longer Term and Emerging Risks, Not Just For Withdrawal


There does seem to be too much country team focus on events up to the
election. Both the country team and Washington need to react to the
"threat" posed by a combination of Iraqi politics, remaining internal
tensions, and a combination of economic and budget pressures interacting
with internal rivalries and rising expectations. Rather than a
worst-case revival of violence, the US may face an election whose
results are as divisive as unifying, pressures to make the Prime
Minister a "president" or strong man, or a government too divided to be
effective.

There is also some risk that the election will coincide with a "perfect
storm" in the form of a continuing budget crisis and limited oil export
income, the phase out of significant grant aid, problems in the quality
of government services and budget execution, and the natural desire of
Iraqis to improve their lives after years of violence and poverty.

If the election does move Iraq towards successful governance, unity, and
development, the key to future US success will increasingly be diplomacy
and civil programs, not the use of the US military or the ISF. It is
critical, however, that we explicitly plan for other contingencies, and
do not prematurely see the election as anything other than one more
uncertain milestone in a process that will take a decade or so to
complete. We need to preserve a sense of urgency in executing both our
civil and military efforts well beyond 2011.

The key US mission is not responsible withdrawal, or to put the Iraqis
in the lead, important as these elements of the US mission are. It is to
execute a transition over the period up to 2011, and beyond, that will
create as strong and independent an Iraq as possible and one that will
be a strategic partner that serves both its own interests and the need
to bring security and stability to the Gulf.

There will be nothing but "critical" periods for the US military
advisory effort between now and the end of 2011 -- and for several years
beyond. The ISF transition to both domestic peacetime security and rule
of law and to being able to defend the country against foreign threats
will require as much help as we can possibly give them. This also is not
a task we can dodge by claiming premature success or shifting the burden
to NATO or any other allies. Either the US side of the effort will
succeed, or the Iraqi side will fail. Our sustained success in Iraq will
hinge on how well we replace massive US forces with an effective and
lasting US advisory effort and the level of military aid we continue to
provide once our combat forces are withdrawn in 2011 and after 2011.

This makes it critical to avoid focusing too much on managing the
withdrawal of US forces, and the tasks the US faces if everything goes
well. It must have as good a set of contingency plans and options for
dealing with serious crises -- particularly because our ability to
intervene and our leverage will steadily diminish with time as our
forces drop and Iraqi politics dominate events.

Once again, some of this planning is already underway in the US team in
Iraq. What is not clear is how much of the planning is complete or its
depth and priority. It also seems to be conducted in a climate where
there is so much concern over asking for added aid resources from the
Administration and Congress, or more strategic patience in sustaining
the US civil and military advisory effort, that the need for a exit is
consistently given priority over an exist strategy.

What the US needs is an integrated civil-military plan that is truly
operational - one that clearly describes the actions to be taken, the
time scales needed, the resources required, and the estimated benefits,
risks, and measures of effectiveness that will give such a plan meaning.
This requires a major modification in past joint campaign plans that
shows how the State Department will take over the lead from the US
military; and that shows how the US will deal with a shift to Iraqi
leadership and control in every important aspect of civil-military
plans.

It also requires a kind of leadership in the Obama Administration that
so far has been as badly lacking as during the Bush Administration.
Strategies are only meaningful to the extent they are actually made
operational through actually given resources, and demonstrate progress
in terms of value measure of effectiveness. The Bush Administration
never understood this in fighting either in Iraq or Afghanistan. In the
case of Iraq, it was rescued by pressure and analysis from the outside
the Administration, and by a unique country team effort led by
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus.

The first 100 days of Obama are long over, and Iraq now seems to only
have half a country team in the form of MNF-I and General Odierno. The
State Department is strong on bluster, but remarkably silent on clear
plans for action. It talked about reform of AID and the US aid effort
and then fell silent. The Joint Chiefs, Secretary of Defense, and NSC
have not even bothered to bluster. If they have clear policy goals,
anything approaching a strategy, and any real concern for providing the
resources actually needed, they have achieved a far higher level of
stealth than any of their predecessors.

Anthony Cordesman is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.